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Rationale, aims and objectives: Much of the literature concerned with healthcare practice tends to 
focus on a decision-making model in which knowledge sits within the minds and bodies of 
healthcare workers. Practice theories de-centre knowledge from human actors, instead situating 
knowing in the interactions between all human and non-human actors. The purpose of this study 
was to explore how practice arises in the moment-to-moment interactions between general dental 
practitioners (GDPs), patients, nurses and things. 
Method: Eight GDPs in two dental practices, their respective nurses, 23 patients and material things 
were video-recorded as they interacted within clinical encounters. Videos were analysed using a 
performative approach. Several analytic methods were used: coding of interactions in-video; pencil 
drawings with transcripts; and dynamic transcription. These were used pragmatically and in 
combination. Detailed reflective notes were recorded at all stages of the analysis and, as new 
insights developed, theory was sought to help inform these. 
Results: We theorised that knowing in dental practice arises as actors translate embodied knowing 
through sayings and doings that anticipate but can’t predict responses, that knowing is constrained 
by the interactions of the practice but that the interactions at the same time are a collective 
bricolage – using the actors’ respective embodied knowing to generate and solve problems together. 
Conclusion: Practices are ongoing ecological accomplishments to which people and things skilfully 
contribute through translation of their respective embodied knowing of multiple practices. Based on 





Efforts to improve outcomes from clinical encounters tend to take a narrow clinician or team-
centred approach and focus on propositional knowledge to the exclusion of other ways of knowing 1. 
Knowledge is a “thing” to be learned, retained and applied as these actors solve problems in clinical 
encounters. Much of the academic writing about clinical practice assumes a ‘decision-making’ model 
– the doctor or dentist is seen as making diagnoses, selecting investigations/treatments and perhaps 
eliciting patients’ preferences – but underpinning all that is an assumed decision tree into which 
evidence can be fed (e.g. 2-6).  There are alternative ways to exploring what goes on as different 
actors come together that de-centre knowledge from human actors, instead situating knowledge, or 
“knowing”, in the interactions between all actors in practice 7,8.  
In these approaches, the knowledge is not an object retained within the boundary of human beings 
9. Rather, knowledge is performative, generated in the moment, situated, interactive, and 
embedded within unique, ephemeral practices as actors perform 10-13. Actors do embody 
representations of practice 14 that we might called embodied knowledge, but knowing happens in 
the practice. The actions of one actor influence (in an ongoing and reciprocal way) those of one or 
more other actors. Knowing in practice is ecological, one-off episodes of interaction that involve 
people, things and the environment at large 15,16. Knowing is not the possession or responsibility of 
any one individual but is an ongoing, collective accomplishment 10.  
We are unaware of any studies that have explored how people and things generate knowing in 
practice in general dental practice. Thus, the purpose of this study was to explore how practice 




We adopted a performative orientation where performativity is the constitution “of actors, 
meanings and roles through socio-material practices” 17. 
DH is an academic general dental practitioner (GDP). His clinical experience includes working in 
general, community and hospital dental services. The work described here is part of DH’s doctorate 
in evidence-based healthcare at the University of Oxford. TG, a general practitioner by training, has 
academic training in social sciences as well as in clinical medicine; she specialises in qualitative 
research in naturalistic (real-world) settings. 
Setting and sampling frame 
We recruited two large general dental practices, providing predominantly National Health Service 
(NHS) treatment, as research sites. One was in a suburb of London and the other on the outskirts of 
a large town near London. The practices were selected because the owners were known to DH. 
Attempts were made to increase the diversity of the sample by recruiting sites through social media 
and dental forums, but they were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the resulting convenience sample 
exhibited a range of features, including years of experience of dentists, patient appointment types 
and nursing experience. 
All appointment types (e.g. check-up, emergency, treatment) were eligible for inclusion. 
Recruitment 
NHS ethical approval for this study was provided by the West of Scotland Research Ethics 
Committee, REC reference 17/WS/0064. 
In the first instance, dentists and nurses in the two practices were invited to participate. After 
gaining written consent, a session for video-recording was arranged. All adult patients with 
appointments to attend these were invited to participate by letter posted two weeks before the 
appointment with a covering letter from the dental practice and a participant information sheet. 
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Figure 1 
Patients were invited to contact DH by telephone or email before their appointment to discuss the 
study and to consent in principle to participate. Written consent was obtained on the day.  
Data collection methods 
We  were interested in how practices unfold in real time, for which video is the optimal method of 
data collection 18,19. The video camera was less obtrusive in small clinical spaces than a person, and 
the captured video could be watched and listened to repeatedly during analysis, rather than relying 
on notes captured in the moment. Over four days in August and September 2017, participants were 
filmed using a fixed digital video camera (Sony Handycam, HDR-CX405) mounted on a tripod. It was 
placed in a position that was unobtrusive to patient and dental team, but which allowed patient, 
dentist, nurse and computer to be captured in the field of view (Fig. 1). DH set up the camera before 
the patient entered the room, pressed record and then left. Once the patient had left the room, DH 
re-entered it and stopped the recording. Video recordings were transferred to a password protected 
computer from the video recorder at the earliest possible moment, the original recordings deleted, 
and the SD card formatted.  
In addition, DH informally observed the goings on in the respective dental practices and spoke with 
staff and patients during the periods of recording. Whilst not a formal part of the data analysis, 
anonymous notes were made of them to help situate the encounters recorded in the videos.  
Units of study 
Clinical encounters are often multi-layered and complex phenomena and so we chose our unit of 
analysis to be one or more conjunctures within each clinical encounter.  Conjunctures are “a critical 
combination of events or circumstances” and may involve a brief or prolonged episode of interaction 
between actors 20. It is through studying very mundane and commonplace aspects of general dental 
practice within conjunctures that we intended to tease out an understanding of how knowing arose 
in practice.  
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Figure 1 
Data processing and analysis 
Informed by texts on the use of video in qualitative research 19,21,22, several analytic methods were 
used. These were used pragmatically and in combination. Detailed reflective notes were recorded at 
all stages of the analysis using electronic note-keeping software (Evernote, Evernote Corporation), 
and as new insights developed, theory was sought to help inform these. 
Coding of videos 
This broad approach involved exploring what sorts of interactions occurred in the clinical encounters 
and to develop a sense of how much each actor was involved. All videos were imported into 
qualitative data analysis software (NVivo Version 11, QSR International Pty Ltd). Each was watched 
and re-watched at least four times as DH coded the actions of each of the three human (patient, 
dentist and nurse) and non-human actors (e.g. Electronic Patient Record, EPR). The coding 
distribution for the ten codes with longest duration from one clinical encounter is shown as an 
example in Fig. 2.  
Pencil drawings and transcript 
We were inspired by Mavers’ working paper on transcribing video 23 to create a pictorial and 
narrative transcription of how humans and material objects interacted in the conjunctures. Goodwin 
created a drawing from a video still to show three girls at play 24 and Mavers used thick narrative to 
describe how children interacted with objects as they learned 25.  
Developing these approaches, DH took stills from one dentist’s conjuncture whenever there was a 
change in physical orientation e.g. a dentist turning to a patient. The stills were turned into a pencil 
image using an Android mobile phone app (Photo Sketch Maker, Aero Tools) and, to bring focus to 
the interactions, all aspects of the image that were not involved directly were removed. The images 
were inserted into vertical consecutive cells in a spreadsheet (Microsoft Excel 2016). A narrative 
description of what was said and done for that section was inserted in the horizontally adjacent cell. 





data using pencil drawings allowed us to surface and explore in-the-moment interactions as a series 
of “freeze frames”, thereby allowing us to develop a highly innovative analysis of knowing in 
practice. 
Dynamic transcription 
We were keen to explore the dynamism of the knowing being enacted. Using a video editing 
software (Camtasia Studio 8, Techsmith Corporation), DH transcribed what was said, the physical 
actions and the embodied knowing he inferred from the actions. Two stills from the video are shown 
as examples in Fig. 4 and 5. The time each element was on the canvas was a minimum of one second 
or for as long as the action occurred, if longer. 
Results 
Description of data set 
The data set included the raw footage of 22 appointments that totalled eight and a half hours, a 
single clinical encounter transcribed in full, with stills converted into pencil and another whole 
encounter transcribed into the video of dynamic coding. DH recorded the equivalent of 
approximately 160 A4 pages using digital note keeping software (Evernote, Evernote Corporation). 
Clinical encounters took the following general form: GDPs would check a patient’s dental record on a 
computer in the surgery either prior to asking the nurse to bring the patient into the room or as the 
nurse was doing so; the patient entered the surgery, there was an exchange of pleasantries and the 
patient sat on the dental chair; the GDP and patient then established or confirmed the reason for 
the visit (e.g. to address a problem or to place a filling) followed by a brief or longer discussion about 
this; the patient would then recline in the dental chair and a degree of interaction between GDP, 
patient, nurse and instruments would centre around examination or intervention within the mouth, 
including the taking of radiographs; the patient would be sat up in the chair and there would be a 
brief or long discussion relating to the prior phase including diagnoses and possible interventions; 
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the patient would leave and the GDP would write notes into the patient’s record as the nurse made 
the surgery ready for the next patient.  
What we focus on below is not the embodied learning GDPs develop per se, which is often the focus 
of, for example, anthropological studies of apprenticeship 26, but on the moment-by-moment 
interactions to which GDPs, other people and things translate their embodied or embedded 
knowing.  
Practice as anticipation 
In these encounters, relationships between people and things were established as temporary 
phenomena through discussion and through prodding and probing, reading and writing, seeing and 
hearing. That is, as one actor said or did something, the other observed, listened or felt and, in due 
course, acted or spoke themselves. This might involve listening to a question and responding, or a 
patient seeing an instrument orientating towards their mouth and opening it. 
Bakhtin wrote of the dialogic relationship that was essential to what he called utterances. 
Utterances are only utterances because there is an anticipation of a responsive understanding by 
another 27. In these clinical encounters, in addition to dialogism in utterances was dialogism in 
actions. Actors said and did things in anticipation of a responsive understanding by another.  
As a GDP picked up a dental mirror and probe to check gum health, for example, the nurse would 
move to the computer and ready herself to record the results without the GDP saying anything. The 
GDP would then slide their chair and position themselves behind the supine patient’s head. The GDP 
would raise the probe and dental mirror over the patients face and the patient almost always 
opened their mouth with no verbal prompting. If they didn’t, then the GDP might place a finger on 
the lower jaw or, rarely, ask the patient to open their mouth. The GDP, nurse and patient all 
appeared to be anticipating the other’s – and the things’ (computer, probe, chairs) – actions and 
reactions. This is not to say that all the reactions were correctly anticipated. For example, a GDP had 
asked a patient to lift their chin and the patient lifted his whole head forward, essentially tilting his 
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chin into his chest, the opposite of what the GDP had anticipated. Nonetheless, the GDP had 
anticipated an action, the patient had acted and in turn anticipated a reaction from the GDP (that 
they would continue with the examination). The GDP, though, reacted with another action to align 
the patient’s head as they needed it before they continued as the patient had anticipated. 
The anticipation of others’ actions suggested to us that the actors had embodied understandings of 
how people and things had reacted in their experience of historical practices. That is, they expected 
that something would happen if they did something because they had an embodied knowing of 
previous interactions in which something had, even if it wasn’t in this or any other clinical space.  
Given the speed with which they did so, this was mostly done unconsciously and working skilfully to 
translate their embodied knowing into this practice. They need not have had an experience that 
followed a similar sequence of interactions between people and things. They may have, instead, 
translated something they had parsed from those previous experiences. Marchand has suggested 
that apprentices parse components of actions they observe their teachers do into “motor 
representations” of how to do things themselves, which they attempt to enact 14. It seems that 
experience of any other practices might be parsed into embodied knoiwing, even when learning how 
to act as a patient. This is to say that there will be elements of practices previously experienced (in 
this space, in another clinical space or somewhere non-clinical) that can be translated in some way 
into the ongoing practice. For example, no matter which instruments were raised over a patient’s 
face by the GDP, the patient almost always opened their mouth. From some experience in the past, 
the patient had come to embody an understanding of how to respond to the appearance of things 
(including the GDP’s hands) over their face. 
Anticipation of others’ actions is common to many aspects of life. In relation to people, we have 
called this dialogism, but in relation to objects, the anticipation is of how the object might be used, 
what Heidegger would call being “ready at hand” 28. A GDP, for example, picked up a dental mirror, 
which is normally used to mirror teeth and other tissues that the GDP cannot see directly. On this 
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Figure 6 
occasion, though, he anticipated it’s potential to elicit pain from around a tooth by turning it through 
180° and tapping the tooth with a sharp knock with the handle. The patient responded with an 
“ow!” and the task of the conjuncture came to focus on working out why.  
The anticipation of a response and the response (with its anticipated response, and so on), whether 
mediated through the spoken word, through touch, sight, sound or smell, through things or not, 
gave rise to an interaction in which shared knowing appeared to exist for the moment. In the 
interaction between them, the GDP, patient and dental mirror handle, generated an act of knowing. 
If the GDP had not anticipated there might be a response from tapping the tooth, he may never have 
applied the tap to the tooth. If he had not anticipated the patient responding (e.g. if she were under 
general anaesthesia) the knowing shared in that moment that something was “wrong” with that 
tooth would not have arisen. If the patient anticipated that something terrible would happen if she 
said “ow” and so didn’t, then the act of knowing would have been different. Conjunctures, in which 
knowing arose, went on through multiple actions that anticipated – but couldn’t predict – reactions.  
The embodied knowing we inferred could be analytically (and only analytically) separated into that 
which is closely aligned with the ongoing conjuncture, similar to what Greenhalgh and Stones called 
conjuncturally-specific knowledge 29, and that which is less closely aligned with the conjuncture, but 
which nonetheless translates into it, which they called general dispositions and Bourdieu called 
habitus 30. Whether the embodied knowing was conjuncturally-specific or not, the translation almost 
always was. Each person or thing, in doing or saying something that interacted with others within 
the conjuncture, translated whatever embodied knowing they had at that time in a way that meant 
the conjuncture went on.  
We illustrate this with Fig. 6. It shows a dentist about to take a photo of a patient’s upper central 
incisor, which had chipped. Not a word was said by the dentist about taking the photo. He had just 
finished looking at the tooth, edged the chair back a fraction and then reached for the camera. As he 
brought it over the patient’s mouth she bared her upper teeth by raising her lip, the nurse moved 
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her right hand to the computer mouse and, as the dentist did, turned her head to the monitor above 
the patient. At this moment, each of the people translated their embodied knowing in actions that 
meant their respective knowing aligned, the photo could be taken, and the conjuncture could go on.  
Constraint and power 
The practice and, therefore, the knowing arising in it, was suffused with power or influence 31,32 as 
the different actors attempted to translate their respective embodied knowing (including of 
influencing others) into the ongoing practice. 
People and things did what they could do within the interactions, which were bound by space and 
time. However, the relationships established through interaction moment-by-moment constrained 
the possible translations of knowing that could occur. For example, at one moment in the 
conjuncture about dental pain mentioned earlier, the dentist was facing the computer as the patient 
described her pain. She had not mentioned where it was but pointed to the upper right side of her 
face. Because the dentist was not looking at her, it meant that the knowing her action attempted to 
translate failed. The translation of the patient’s embodied knowing was constrained by the in-the-
moment relationship between her, the GDP and the computer. Similarly, in an encounter involving 
another GDP and patient, the GDP had set the chair in motion to go supine. The patient had been 
complaining that a previous filling was too high. He lifted his head from the dental chair rather than 
lying supine as all other patients did, as he continued protesting. The patient’s translation of his 
discomfort and dissatisfaction were constrained by his interaction with the chair and the GDP. The 
GDP’s translation of the planned activity (restoration of another tooth) was constrained by his 
interaction with the patient and the filling in his mouth. A final example was the bodily positioning of 
a patient who looked at the wall rather than the GDP as she explored his oral hygiene habits. Her 
confidence in addressing this appeared to wane. This was in stark contrast to the next patient who 
turned in the chair and attended to her with evident interest as she explored his oral hygiene habits.  
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Most of the time the constraints didn’t manifest so obviously but all appointments were constrained 
by interactions with the other people, the equipment, the space and time. Actors were constrained 
by their environment. This, we consider to be part of the situatedness of action. Whatever the 
representations the different actors embodied about these practices, what we could call ostensive 
practices, were quite different to the situated performed practice because of these constraints and 
the reactions of others.  
Translation of knowing of practices inscribed in, for example, the computer software could also be 
constrained by the conjuncture’s interactions. Thus, a template of questions from NHS England that 
was embedded within the check-up page on the computer software prompted some dentists to ask 
several questions about the patients’ habits related to risk of oral diseases e.g. their sugar, tobacco 
and alcohol consumption, and oral hygiene regime but didn’t prompt others. The dentists who read 
the list out tended to be more focused on the computer than the dentists who did not, who 
attended more to the patient.  
The template from NHS England is an example of an expert system, which is a “disembedding 
mechanisms because… they remove social relations from the immediacies of context” 33. Through it 
members of that and other organisations attempted to constrain the activities of GDPs. Sometimes 
the interactions allowed this other actor to induce different actions (one in which a dentist asked 
questions about behaviour) whilst others didn’t. Through their direct (discursive practices and touch) 
or indirect actions (via intermediaries such as artefacts) each actor attempted to influence the 
ongoing interactions, induce different knowing to co-exist and therefore to shape the unfolding 
practice.  
Collective bricolage 
Practice was accomplished through the adaptive translation of knowing from the different people 
and the things they interacted with. People and things did what they could, given the interactions 
between them, and generated actions (e.g. creating a problem, creating a solution) for the 
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conjuncture to go on, to come to an end (at least for now) and for the constellation of actors to 
disperse. Like the bricoleur who, with their limited skill set and tools, solves problems as best they 
can 34, together people and things generated and solved problems in a collective bricolage. Patients 
used the words they knew from non-dental experiences, for example, to describe their dental 
experiences. They offered focused reflections on experiences they had, such as taking medication 
when they shouldn’t because of a medical diagnosis. They offered up proposals of what could be 
wrong, of what prior treatment they had received that might be relevant, of their habits and their 
symptoms. GDPs observed and listened, made suggestions of diagnoses and treatment approaches, 
used the instruments and materials at hand in different ways (the mirror handle mentioned 
previously, a probe designed for screening only to make diagnoses), took radiographs. All of them, 
working together, using their respective capacities, created the practice in that moment.  
An example is the way in which a problem was fashioned within a check-up appointment to create a 
conjuncture related to relieving a denture that was pressing on a patient’s palatal mucosa (the skin 
on the palate). The patient mentioned that there was a sore patch under her denture, which she 
believed related to the denture. The dentist listened and, as part of a check-up, looked at the 
denture and the mucosa under it. After a few moments he suggested that a tooth on the denture 
was pushing into the mucosa because he could see a red area that related to the position of the 
underside of the tooth. He explained he would adjust the denture, which the patient acceded to, 
picked up a handpiece with a bur designed to trim the acrylic from a denture and removed the 
offending part as the patient watched. When replaced, she said it felt fine. Each of the actions were 
attempts to translate embodied knowing as best they could so that they could generate the problem 
and solution collaboratively. The skill was in the respective and ongoing translations of knowing 
within the interaction by each actor. GDPs didn’t act alone in their surgeries. They enacted practices 
with the patient, nurse and things.  
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Discussion 
This study of eight GDPs interacting with patients has shown that knowing in general dental practice 
occurs as transitory interactions between humans and things within clinical conjunctures. The 
relationships between people and things within these interactions allow for a temporary shared 
knowing to co-exist. Each relationship was soon replaced with another as participants acted and 
reacted over time and space. The possible translation of embodied or embedded knowing through 
actions was constrained by the ongoing interaction. Thus, the knowing that could arise was 
dependent not only on the embodied knowing but on the translation of this in such a way that it 
could contribute to the collective knowing in practice. Finally, the various participants worked 
together to solve the problems and create solutions as best they could in a collective bricolage. 
In this study we have sought to build on previous work that suggested healthcare workers require 
many more sources of knowledge than that provided by research 35 and are guided by internal, tacit 
and socially constituted guidelines, or mindlines, and that “knowledge in practice” is the use of this 
complex knowledge in the clinical context 36-38. The concept of knowledge in practice differs from the 
social anthropological, organisational and educational literature’s “knowing in practice” 11-13. The 
former seems more concerned with some-thing, a practical knowledge used by clinicians as they 
practice. The latter is more concerned with some-doing and stresses the socio-material, ephemeral, 
provisional and collective nature of knowing in the practice. As Marchand writes, “…acts of making 
knowledge are always and necessarily realised in interaction with others and with the world.” 39 
Practice, and the knowing that arises in it, is ecological. This paper contributes to the literature of 
clinical practice by suggesting that for conjunctures to go on (i.e. for clinical problems to be 
generated and, hopefully, solved), multiple temporary relationships between people and things 
need to be established in such a way that knowing relevant to the conjuncture can align. This shifts 
the focus from concentrating on what a clinician “knows” to the knowing they play a part in 
generating, which is situated in their environment and with the people and things there. Harris, 
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writing from an anthropological perspective, implores us to remember that knowing is bound up 
with the world and that, “a person does not leave their environment to know, even when she is 
dealing with the most abstract of propositions” 13. GDPs, patients, nurses and things, we suggest, 
only know in the moment-by-moment unfolding of clinical encounters. They may leave with a 
representation of this encounter as they may an encounter elsewhere, with an interpretation they 
come to embody, but they only know this practice as they interact with each other. 
Relevant here, also, is the concept of Habitus. Bourdieu wrote that it is “…embodied history, 
internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history - is the active presence of the whole past 
of which it is the product”. Actors acted based on their embodied or embedded knowing of multiple 
practices across time (or history) and space. We don’t think of Habitus as a product but a dynamic 
embodied phenomenon that generates “practical hypotheses based on past experience” 30.  
We have intentionally offered a description of practice that makes it complex, even when addressing 
routine and mundane clinical decisions and interactions. Evidence-based healthcare intended to 
bring research, clinical expertise and patient values and aspirations together but has tended to focus 
on getting practitioners to change their actions, or patients to change their behaviours, to be more 
aligned with what researchers suggests will improve patients’ wellbeing, the efficiency of care or 
some other outcome of interest. We think, based on our findings and the epistemology of practice 
to which we contribute, that there is a need to pay much more attention to the complexity of 
practices and to recognise that what people translate into ongoing practices is not propositional 
knowledge but embodied knowing of practices they have either experienced personally, observed 
or, as other work we have yet to publish suggests, through vicarious experiences i.e. others’ stories 
of their practices.  
The role of the GDP in practice is as one of several who together shape the conjuncture, in contrast 
to traditional decision-making models in which the professional is often the only one conceived as 
bringing (a usually “scientific”) knowledge to an encounter so that they can diagnose and treat 
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problems. Several authors have suggested ways of thinking about professional knowing that are 
alternative to this. Montgomery, in How doctors think, wrote that whilst scientific information can 
help reduce uncertainty, ultimately medicine is still a practice 40. Mol, in The body multiple: Ontology 
in medical practice, wrote that the doctor’s knowing of a disease was but one of several. The patient, 
the pathologist and others with a stake in living with, diagnosing or managing a disease each had 
their own knowing of that disease 41. Billett, argued that knowing in practice is the construction of 
knowing in a social world rather than knowledge as a cognitive thing. Practice in a given situation 
requires knowing that arises in the situation that can influence the way in which skills are enacted 11. 
We want to emphasise that whilst the dentist brings an embodied knowing to the encounter, so too 
does the patient, other people and material things. Professional knowing is more than that which is 
embodied by “the professional”. It is instead a dynamic, reflexive and ongoing activity to which the 
patient, other people and many things, each translating their respective knowing, contribute. 
Professional knowing cannot exist out of the performance of professional practice or without the 
patients and other actors that are central to that practice.  
If we are concerned with the quality of clinical care we need to think beyond propositional 
knowledge, which takes the form of research publications, systematic reviews and guidance. The 
care that arises (or not) in practice is one that arises from an embodied knowledge or knowing, and 
which is translated into interactions that constrain it on the one hand and generate other knowing 
on the other. Whilst communication is an important component of the interaction between people 
and things, there are other interactions that interfere with or promote the translation of actors’ 
knowing. Practice is ecological – it takes place in an environment where people and things interact 
through restricting, touching, pushing, prodding, smelling, marking (instruments), images and 
sounds. And people learn to act within practice much as apprentices do, “through observation, 
mimesis and repeated exercise” 42. Clinical care arises through the non-propositional, through the 
translation of knowledge embodied or embedded in bodies and things. The embodiment of learning 
from multiple practices, each in their own environment and with all the parsed learning they take 
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from that, is what GDPs, patients and nurses draw on to act and react in ways that are relevant to 
the ongoing conjuncture. If the practice of clinicians and teams is to be evaluated, this needs to be 
done in relation to their respective ecology. A clinician’s activities cannot be evaluated out of 
relation to their environment.  If we want to help improve practice, rather than focusing on 
disseminating propositional knowledge in the form of guidelines, we should focus on finding ways to 
allow dental teams, patients and things to take part in and contribute to practices as they improve. 
Or at the very least, offer vicarious experiences in the form of narratives of how others practicing in 
similar ecologies improved their practices 43. They may then come to embody knowing of practices 
not as accomplished “good practice” but as the active phenomena they are. As others have shown 
with apprenticeship, we learn to embody knowing of practices by observing, having a go, and 
correcting what we do. We suggest that practices are more likely to improve if we embody knowing 
of practices of improving.  
Limitations 
DH was the only person to analyse the data in depth. Sections of video were analysed with TG and 
interpretations of what was happening discussed regularly throughout the analysis. The concept of 
practices taking place within a nexus of other practices and the translation of an embodied knowing 
into an ongoing practice, means that the practice of interacting with the data involved translating 
into it an embodied knowing of other practices. DH (as a dentist) had an embodied knowing of some 
dental practices that were very similar to those being observed, whereas TG (as a non-dentist) 
embodied a lifetime of GP practices and of theoretical writings relevant to practice. Thus, the 
detailed analysis and interpretation of the data was appropriate for DH to do alone, with TG bringing 
a critical perspective to the findings based on her theoretical and GP experience. 
Conclusion  
Practices are ongoing ecological accomplishments to which people and things skilfully contribute 
through translation of their respective embodied knowing of multiple practices. Based on this, we 
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Figure 1 Typical field of view during video recording  
 
Figure 2 An example of coding activities from one clinical encounter. Duration is in minutes, seconds 
and tenths of a second 
 
Figure 3 Excerpt from transcript of one conjuncture showing time from beginning of video when still 
was taken, the stills and associated narrative 
 
Figure 4 Still 1 from dynamic coding of a conjuncture. Text in bubbles are enactments. Floating text 
is knowing of practices embodied and translated as inferred from the saying and doing by DH. 
 
Figure 5 Still 2 from dynamic coding of a conjuncture. Text in bubbles are enactments. Floating text 
is knowing of practices embodied and translated as inferred from the saying and doing by DH. 
 
Figure 6 Still showing a dentist about to take a photo of a patient’s upper central incisor 
